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Abstract
Unified communications has enabled seamless data sharing between multiple devices running on various platforms. Traditionally,
organizations use local servers to store data and employees access the data using desktops with predefined security policies. In
the era of unified communications, employees exploit the advantages of smart devices and 4G wireless technology to access the
data from anywhere and anytime. Security protocols such as access control designed for traditional setup are not sufficient when
integrating mobile devices with organization’s internal network. Within this context, we exploit the features of smart devices
to enhance the security of the traditional access control technique. Dynamic attributes in smart devices such as unlock failures,
application usage, location and proximity of devices can be used to determine the risk level of an end-user. In this paper, we
seamlessly incorporate the dynamic attributes to the conventional access control scheme. Inclusion of dynamic attributes provides
an additional layer of security to the conventional access control. We demonstrate that the efficiency of the proposed algorithm is
comparable to the efficiency of the conventional schemes.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays organizations demand a host of tools, including
desktop and smart devices, email, instant messaging, voice
mail, presence information and audio, video and Web confer-
encing. When these tools are integrated into a system that
allows seamless data sharing among devices then it’s called
unified communications network. Integrating smart devices
within traditional network increases productivity among em-
ployees as well as new security vulnerabilities. Traditionally,
organizations store data in local servers while employees ac-
cess the data using access control techniques. However, the re-
cent trend towards cloud computing, outsourcing, smart devices
or Bring-Your-Own-Devices (BYOD), and high bandwidth mo-
bile broadband has enabled organizations to share information
anywhere and anytime. Data could be shared using public data
storages such as cloud computing infrastructure which can pro-
vide flexible computing capabilities, reduced costs and capital
expenditures and charge based on to usage.
In particular, BYOD became a hot topic after the 2012’s
Cisco survey which has found that 95% of the employees are
allowed to use their mobile devices within their organizations
∗Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 (0)20 7040 8377, Fax.: +44 (0)20 7040
[14]. Since then the number users use their personnel device
for work has increased exponentially across the globe [15, 16].
This trend is against the tradition where employees are allo-
cated with company devices embedded with specific softwares
and policies to achieve security. Currently researchers are fo-
cusing on developing techniques to securely virtualize the user
device hence the corporate data will be protected from data
breaches [41, 42]. Samsung and BlackBerry use technologies
called KNOX, and BES12, respectively to enforce the corporate
security policies on user’s device [29, 30].
This trend requires new ways to control the access of data
stored in cloud. Traditionally, we assume that data owners,
users, and storage server are in the same domain and also that
the server is fully trusted [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. However, in
BYOD, cloud computing and outsourcing environments, data
confidentiality is not guaranteed since the data is stored and
processed within the third party environment. Personnel infor-
mation of the data owners and commercial interests of users can
be leaked to third party if the data owners store decrypted data
in public servers. To overcome this challenge, the data confi-
dentiality in a distributed environment is achieved via attribute
based encryption (ABE) technique [10, 11, 12, 13].
ABE is considered as a promising cryptographic technique
and supports both the data confidentiality and access control
simultaneously [10, 11, 12, 13]. Using ABE, the data owners
can encrypt the data using fine-grained access policies. For in-
stance, let us assume, an employer uploads encrypted file to the
cloud using ABE, where access policy of that file is defined us-
ing the following attributes and functions AND and OR: “Man-
ager” OR “Finance Office” AND “Company A”. Hence, an
employee who is a “Manager” employed at “Company A” can
8566
Email addresses: fei.li.1@city.ac.uk (Fei Li), 
yogachandran.rahulamathavan.1@city.ac.uk (Yogachandran 
Rahulamathavan), conti@math.unipd.it (Mauro Conti), 
R.Muttukrishnan@city.ac.uk (Muttukrishnan Rajarajan)
1Mauro Conti is supported by a EU Marie Curie Fellowship for the project 
PRISM-CODE (grant n. PCIG11-GA-2012-321980). This work has been par-
tially supported by the TENACE PRIN Project (grant n. 20103P34XC) funded 
by the Italian MIU
decrypt the file. There are two major types of ABE schemes:
single authority based ABE [11] and multiple authorities based
ABE (MA-ABE) [32] schemes. In a single authority based
ABE scheme, only one authority called attribute authority (AA)
is responsible for monitoring all the attributes. In MA-ABE, in
contrast to the single authority ABE scheme, there are multiple
attribute authorities responsible for a disjoint sets of attributes.
When it comes to BYOD, the ABE cannot directly be used
to protect the data due to the user’s mobility. It should be noted
that the data confidentiality in the ABE schemes relies only
on predefined static attributes such “Manager”, “Finance Of-
fice”, and “Company A”. Let us consider the previous example,
where an employee has the long term credentials for the follow-
ing attributes: “Manager”, and “Company A”. Hence, she can
access the encrypted file while she is traveling in public trans-
port using her personnel mobile device. However, the risk level
associated in this context is high. In fact, people in her prox-
imity might easily see confidential data via shoulder surfing. It
is also possible for an adversary to steal the employee’s mo-
bile device, and get unauthorized access to the corporate data if
there is no real-time verification (assuming that the credentials
for static attributes are stored within mobile). Hence, evalu-
ating the data collected by smart device’s sensors in real-time
provides additional layer of security. In particular smart device
attributes such as location, app usage patterns, unlock failures,
Wi-Fi networks and proximity of devices could be exploited for
real-time verification. We refer the attributes collected via smart
devices as dynamic attributes since they change every time with
the user’s mobility.
In this paper, we propose a new algorithm which supports the
organizations to incorporate dynamic attributes within the ABE
scheme for robust access control. The novelty of our algorithm
are listed below:
1. new algorithm enforces the dynamic attributes to the con-
ventional ABE scheme
2. new algorithm does not compromise the security of the
conventional ABE scheme
3. new algorithm supports both the single authority and multi
authority schemes
4. performance of the new algorithm is comparable with the
conventional ABE scheme
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: we re-
view related works in Section 2. We describe the system ar-
chitecture and various types of attacks in Section 3. In Section
4, we propose the static and dynamic ABE scheme for single
authority scheme followed by a MA-ABE scheme in Section 5.
We compare the performance of the proposed schemes against
the conventional ABE schemes in Section 6. Section 7 is ded-
icated for analyzing the security and privacy issues of the pro-
posed schemes. Conclusions, limitations and future works are
discussed in Section 8.
2. Related Work
Access control is a classical security issue. Various access
control models have been proposed in literature. In 1996,
Sandhu et. al proposed the feasible access control model called
role-based access control (RBAC) [1]. It simplifies authoriza-
tion and administration because a security administrator needs
only to revoke and assign the new appropriate role memberships
if a user changes her job function. Various improved RBAC
models have been proposed and been widely used in practice.
Zhang et. al extended the RBAC model to support context in-
formation called context-aware dynamic access control scheme
[2]. In [2], a user is assigned with access credentials based on
her roles (i.e., a set of attributes) and context information. The
resource maintains a set of roles and assign a potential role with
certain permissions to the user.
Similar works have been proposed based on temporal condi-
tion called a temporal RBAC in [4] and based on wider range of
event and environmental conditions called event-based RBAC
in [3]. In [3] and [4], the event was defined as measurable,
dynamic context variables that can influence access decisions
besides the location and time variables. In [17], both the spa-
tial and temporal attributes were exploited to support patient-
centric access control scheme in e-healthcare. All these works
successfully extend the RBAC model to enforce the context in-
formation for access control. However, the central architecture
of RBAC is not suitable for today’s mobile environment since
the data and users are not restricted to be in the same environ-
ment i.e., outsourcing the data to cloud and usage of smart de-
vices.
Mobile RBAC system which enforces spatially-aware (loca-
tion) RBAC policies is proposed in [6]. In [6], an object is
equipped with a near field communication (NFC) receiver and
the user has an NFC enabled handset. Thus, the users can access
certain resources by exchanging credentials using NFC proto-
cols. The NFC receiver verifies the location of the user, but also
restrains the range of the implementation since the user has to
access the resource by going to an access point.
Hasen et. al presented an extended version of RBAC model
for mobile systems [5]. They extended the RBAC model by in-
troducing the notion of environmental roles in order to control
permission sets by activation and/or deactivation of roles based
on spatial information. The main difference in their work with
others’ is that the availability of permission sets depend on spa-
tial information within the same active role. Permissions are
dynamically assigned to the role dependent on location. Thus
it reduces the number of roles that needs to be specified within
the system.
In [7], the authors presented a more complex location-aware
RBAC model. There are two kinds of associations roles are
possible with locations: the role can only be assigned to a user
when he is in certain designated locations and some roles can
only be activated in some specific locations. Both of the works
in [5] and [7] incorporate the spatial-temporal information in
the RBAC model, but they do not consider other important con-
textual attributes which are important in today’s mobile envi-
ronment.
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Table 1: Comparison of Related Works. The proposed work incorporate support more dynamic attributes than other works.
Dynamic Attributes
Static
At-
tributes
Spatial OR
Temporal
Attribute
App Usage Unlock Failure Proximity etc
Data Confi-
dentiality
Context Aware RBAC [2] X X × × × × ×
Event Driven RBAC [3] X X × × × × ×
Temporal RBAC [4] X X × × × × ×
Spatial RBAC [5] X X × × × × ×
Spatial Temporal RBAC [6] X X × × × × ×
Location Aware RBAC [7] X X × × × × ×
Location Aware AAC [8] X X × × × × ×
Spatial-Temporal and E-health
[17]
X X × × × × ×
Location Based Encryption [18] X X × × × × X
Location and Mobile [19] X X × × × × X
Geoencryption [20] X X × × × × X
Secure Localization [21] X X × × × × X
Location Based Encryption [23] X X × × × × X
Proposed Scheme X X X X X X X
It should be noted that the works discussed so far have not
focused on the data confidentiality. These works assumed that
the storage server is secure, hence the data stored in the server
is not encrypted. As said in the introduction, these traditional
access control techniques are not suitable for the current unified
communications network. Let us now discuss the existing ac-
cess control techniques where the data is stored in the encrypted
format.
Liao et. al proposed a location-based data encryption tech-
nique using static locations [19]. In this work, each static lo-
cation contains pre-determined longitude and latitude coordi-
nates. The concept of “geoencryption” or “location-based en-
cryption” was developed to use in digital film distribution by
Logan Scott et. al [18]. Omar et. al presented a geoencryption
protocol by restricting the decryption of a message to a partic-
ular location and time period [20]. The encryption in this work
is similar to [19] where the locations were static which means
those are pre-defined in the system.
Vijayalakshmi et. al proposed a secure localization using el-
liptic curve cryptography (ECC) in wireless sensor networks,
where determining the physical positions of sensors is a funda-
mental and crucial problem for the wireless sensor network op-
eration [21]. In [21], the location based authentication scheme
was built based on the identity-based cryptography using ECC
and ECC key exchange. Karimi et. al [22] presented a geoen-
cryption protocol which allows the mobile nodes to communi-
cate with each other by restriction when decoding a message
in the specific location and time period. Similar technique was
applied for mobile devices in [23].
In [8], an access control framework is proposed using IEEE
802.11 protocol, whereby the access to a wireless local area
network (WLAN) system is granted if and only if the client
is located within the areas covered by multiple access points.
When client comes to such areas then she will receive decryp-
tion credentials via IEEE 802.11 protocol. However, when a
user is out of the wireless signal broadcasting range, then she
could not get access to the system. The authors in [9] proposed
a methodology which examines and analysis whether an access
control model is adequately protected. It helps the developer to
consider the security when enforcing contextual information in
RBAC model. It should be stressed that these encryption based
access control methods are not dynamic and not scalable. Table
1 compares these works with the our work which incorporates
dynamic attribute into the access control. In Table 1, we denote
X,×, as the compatibility of support and no support, respec-
tively. Table 1 clearly shows that our work is significantly dif-
ferent from other existing works. Let us review some of the pio-
neering works in ABE. ABE was firstly proposed by Sahai and
Waters [10], where they constructed an identity based encryp-
tion (IBE) of a message under several attributes that compose
a fuzzy identity. There are two main types of ABE schemes
namely key-policy attribute-based encryption which was pro-
Figure 1: Single authority ABE scheme.
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posed by Goyal et al. [11], and ciphertext-policy attribute-based
encryption which was proposed in [12]. Chase [31] presented
a MA-ABE system which allows any polynomial number of
independent attribute authorities to monitor attributes and dis-
tribute private-keys. The data owner can decide a number dk
and a set of attributes from an AA, and encrypt a message such
that only a user with minimum dk number of attributes from the
revelent AA can decrypt the message.
Chase et. al proposed another work [32] which improved the
previous scheme [31]. In [32], central authority was removed,
and anonymous key issuing protocol which address the privacy
of the user was proposed. Lewko et. al proposed a fully de-
centralized ABE scheme, where user could have zero or more
attributes from each AA and do not require a trusted server [33].
In their work, the AA can join and leave the system freely with-
out re-initializing the system.
The work in [43] is about outsourcing the computational and
communications complexity of the users to a semi-trusted au-
thority. A new cryptographic scheme has been designed to ex-
ploit the semi-trusted authority without violating the privacy
concern. However, the core idea of coming up with a new
scheme to exploit the features of smart devices is presented
here. The proposed work systematically identifies the weak-
nesses of existing access control schemes and validates the im-
portance of the new scheme. More importantly, the suitability
of the new scheme is validated using extended simulations us-
ing a mobile test bed.
3. Problem Statement
This section presents system architecture, security and pri-
vacy threats associated with the propose approach and main as-
sumptions applicable to the rest of this work.
3.1. System Architecture
The proposed system consists of the following four com-
ponents: users (or employees), data owner (or organizations),
cloud service provider, and attribute authorities. An illustra-
tion of the components of the system as well as relationships
between them are provided in Fig. 1.
Users are equipped with one or more smart devices. The
smart device has an active Internet connection which enables
the user to request and receive any data or services from any-
where and at anytime. Since the proposed technique uses bilin-
ear paring using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), any smart
device currently performing RSA encryption and decryption
(i.e., SSL) can run the proposed technique since the key size re-
quired for ECC is 224-bits which substantially lower than 2048-
bits RSA key size. Hence, we assume that the smart device has
sufficient battery power to carry out required computation in
order to decrypt the data.
Data Owners upload the encrypted data to the cloud stor-
age and define access policies. In our scheme, the data owner
defines access policies based on static attributes obtained from
AA together with dynamic attributes. Thus, data owner can de-
cide who is able to decrypt the data from where and in what
circumstances.
Cloud Service Providers provide cloud storage and compu-
tational power to both the users and data owners. In our scheme,
we assume that data owner will upload the encrypted data to the
storage while the user will download the encrypted data from
the storage. It is reasonable to assume that the cloud will pro-
vide the processing power to find the encrypted-data file to the
user based on keyword searching.
Attribute Authorities manage and maintain static attributes
of the users. Different authorities manage different sets of at-
tributes. A user needs to prove her attributes to the authorities
in order to receive the decryption key for each attribute from
corresponding authority. This is achieved using the anonymous
key-issuing protocol proposed in [32]. In the proposed scheme,
it should be noted that for the dynamic attributes, there is no
need to have an AA to distribute encryption and decryption cre-
dentials e.g., for location attribute the device uses GPS module
to obtain longitude and latitude.
3.2. Attribute Based Encryption
ABE allows the data to be encrypted in such a way that the
encrypted data can only be accessed by individuals who have
the credentials for necessary attributes. In ABE scheme, trusted
attribute authorities maintain encryption and decryption creden-
tials for various attributes. These attribute authorities verify the
user attributes before releasing the corresponding decryption
credentials for the attributes. Data owner obtains the encryp-
tion credentials for a set of attributes from the AA, and encrypts
the data using those credentials. Once encryption is successful,
the encrypted data can be uploaded into the cloud storage where
any users with the decryption credentials will be able to decrypt
the data. Fig. 1 shows how data owner, AA and users interact
with each other.
3.3. Security and Privacy Threats
There are number of known security and privacy threats hin-
der the access control schemes. Let us provide a list of potential
attacks and relate them to the requirements of the system.
• Identity-related threats: The main threat we need to con-
sider is related to the identities of the elements involved in
the protocol. Adversary might impersonate as one of the
entities and try to establish a connection to a legitimate
entity. Our goal is to prevent an adversary from imperson-
ating a legitimate entity.
• Privacy-related threats: In order to receive the decryp-
tion key, a user needs to provide her attributes to the au-
thority. Hence, a malicious authority might profile the
users and their requested attributes. Our aim is to provide
privacy guarantee to the users, hence, any AA will not be
able to profile the users.
• Collusion attacks: Each AAmanages a set of attributes in
our system, hence, authorities can collide with each other
to infer user attributes. This will allow the malicious au-
thorities to profile the user based on different set of at-
tributes user has with the malicious authorities. Similarly,
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two users can collide and get access to data which are not
accessible by the users individually. Our goal is to protect
collusion attacks both at the end-user and at the AA.
• Dynamic attribute cheating: Smart devices capture dy-
namic attributes such as unlock failures, app usage, loca-
tion and near by devices using the local sensors. It is cru-
cial for the data owner to ensure that the user’s device is
not modified (rooted) or tampered in order to feed false
dynamic attributes. Hence, we need to consider a set of
technologies in order to guarantee that there is no attribute
cheating is possible.
• Tracking threats: The app installed within user device
needs to collect the sensor data to determine the values for
dynamic attributes. If the app is malicious then that can
pass the sensor data to third-parties who can then be able
to track the user. Hence it is important to have technolo-
gies which protect the users from being tracked by third-
parties.
We explain how our new algorithm mitigates all these threats
in the security and privacy analysis section later in this paper.
In the next section, we define a set of complexity assumptions
followed by dynamic and static ABE algorithm for a single AA
case.
4. Dynamic and Static Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme
for Single AA
4.1. Assumptions and Design Principles
In the proposed scheme, we assume that users have an app in-
stalled on their smart device which captures dynamic attributes.
These attributes have been used together with the static at-
tributes of the user to satisfy the access policy defined by the
data owner.
4.1.1. Dynamic Attributes
Dynamic attributes such as location, time, temperature,
noise, light, the presence of other devices, a particular inter-
action between the user and the smartphone, or a combination
of these were used in [37, 38, 39, 40] to define fine-grain ac-
cess policies in smart device environment. In [28], authors pro-
posed an access scheme to dynamically control the device lock-
ing timeout and unlocking method based on perceived safety
and real-time context in mobile devices. Recently, a novel be-
havior profiling technique has been developed to detect misuse
of mobile devices based on these dynamic attributes [24, 25].
Mobile user activities such as app usage, network usage, charg-
ing times and unlock failures have been used to profile the user
behavior. Hence, variations in user activity (i.e., anomalous ac-
tivity) can be detected. The works in [37, 38, 39, 40, 24, 25, 28]
combines dynamic attributes and time stamp and uses machine
learning techniques to detect anomaly activities. This function-
ality could be incorporated with mobile apps i.e., let us call this
app as “behavior-profiling” app.
As shown in Fig. 2 the app will be installed within a secure
container. This container is monitored by employer using soft-
ware platforms such as KNOX or BES12 [29, 30]. Static at-
tributes also stored within the secure container. The values for
dynamic attributes are obtained from the smartphones raw sen-
sors (e.g., GPS sensor) and logical sensors. Logical sensors
are functions which combine raw data from physical sensors to
capture specific user behaviours (such as detecting whether the
user is running). We assume that the mapping function as well
as the logical sensor reside within secure container to mitigate
user’s malicious activity. Security and privacy analysis of the
behaviour-profiling app is discussed in Section 7.4.
Figure 2: Proposed algorithm’s architecture at high level.
4.1.2. Preliminaries
Bilinear Pairings: Let G1, G2 be two multiplicative groups
of prime order q and let g1 and g2 be generators of G1 and G2,
respectively. Let us denote a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT .
The map has the following three properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀x ∈ G1,∀y ∈ G2, and a, b ∈ Zq, there is
eˆ(xa, yb) = eˆ(x, y)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: For ∀x ∈ G1,∀y ∈ G2, there is eˆ(x, y) ,
1.
3. Computability: eˆ is an efficient computation.
Lagrange Interpolation: Shamir’s secret share uses Lagrange
interpolation technique to obtain the secret from shared-secrets.
Suppose that p(x) ∈ Zp[x] is a (k − 1) degree polynomial and
secret s = p(0). Let us denote S = {x1, x2, . . . , xk} and the
Lagrange coefficient for xi in S as
∆xi,S (x) =
∏
x j ∈ S , x j ,xi
x − x j
xi − x j
.
For a given k different number of values p(x1), p(x2), . . ., p(xk),
the polynomial p(x) can be reconstructed as follows,
p(x) =
∑
xi ∈ S
p(xi)
∏
x j ∈ S , x j ,xi
x − x j
xi − x j
=
∑
xi ∈ S
p(xi)∆xi,S (x),
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hence the secret s can be obtained as:
s = p(0) =
∑
xi ∈ S
p(xi)
∏
x j ∈ S , x j ,xi
0 − x j
xi − x j
.
Mapping: We consider a linear comparison function namely
mapping denoted as M. This function takes two inputs: one
from smart device sensors (i.e., location) and the second one
from the data owner. Data owner must embed the required sen-
sor data and boolean operations. The output of the mapping
function is “yes” or “no” by comparing the both the inputs. For
example, this function can extract data from smart device’s GPS
module and compare with locations in data owners input and
output “yes” or “no” i.e., M(“data f rom GPS ” = “London”) =
no. It should be noted that this function can be embedded se-
curely within any smartphone apps which calls required sensors
at device level. Similar to the XACML policy language, the
data owner can even define a range of values for sensor data.
However data owner needs embed a boolean function with the
data to expedite the comparison process.
4.1.3. Complexity Assumption
Decisional Modified Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (MBDH) As-
sumption [10]: Suppose a challenger chooses a, b, c, z R
←−−
Zp
at random. The Decisional MBDH assumption is that no
polynomial-time adversary is to be able to distinguish the tuple
(A = ga, B = gb, C = gc, Z = e(g, g)
ab
c ) from (A = ga, B = gb,
C = gc, Z = e(g, g)z) with more than a negligible advantage.
We will use this property to prove by contradiction that our
proposed algorithm is secure against well-known attacks. Later
in this paper, we will show that if there is an adversary who
can break the proposed algorithm then we can use the adver-
sary indirectly to break the MBDH assumption (i.e., this is a
contradiction to the MBDH assumption, hence our proposed
algorithm is secure).
4.2. Proposed Scheme
In contrast to the conventional ABE scheme described in
Section 3.2, we will show in this section that how to efficiently
incorporate the dynamic attributes to the conventional ABE
scheme, where the data owner can encrypt the data by not only
using the credentials obtained from the AA, but also using dy-
namic attributes. Similar to the conventional ABE [11], the pro-
posed algorithm also composed of four sub-algorithms namely
setup, key issuing, encryption, and decryption. The proposed
algorithm is given in Fig. 3 (the steps which are different from
conventional ABE scheme are denoted as *). Let us briefly ex-
plain the functionalities of each sub-algorithms below.
Setup: The setup algorithm takes a security parameter λ as
input and output a bilinear group and a set of parameters. Pa-
rameters q, g and G1 are public parameters, {Ti = g
tA,i } and
Y = eˆ(g, g)y are public-keys of the attributes maintained by an
authority and y, tA,i ∈ Zq for each attribute i (1 ≤ i ≤ N) are
private-keys known only to AA where N is the total number of
attributes monitored by the authority.
Key Issuing: The AA generates decryption key for a user u
who holds a set of attributes by randomly generating an unique
polynomial pu for u. However, pu(0) = y for all the users. Then,
AA will issue a decryption credential Di(u) to the user u for her
ith attribute.
Encryption: The encryption algorithm takes a set of at-
tributes maintained by AA as well as a set of dynamic attributes
defined by the data owner as input. Then it output the cipher-
text of the data. In this step, data owner generates private-keys
sA and sB and the corresponding public-keys E0 and Ei for all
attributes. The hash value of dynamic attributes is incorporated
in E0.
Decryption: The decryption algorithm takes the decryp-
tion credentials received from AA, dynamic parameters ob-
tained from smart mobile device and the ciphertext as input
and then output the original data. The behavior-profiling app
securely computes the hash value of the required dynamic at-
tributes followed by multiplication with Y sA . The decryp-
tion is successful if and only if h(M(a′
c,1
)||M(a′
c,2
)|| . . . ||M(a′c,n))
= h(M(ac,1)||M(ac,2)|| . . . ||M(ac,n)).
The novelty in our scheme compared to the conventional
ABE scheme lies in the encryption and the decryption sub-
algorithms in Fig. 3. Let us denote the dynamic attribute
set defined by the data owner as AC = {ac,1, . . . , ac,n} where
ac,i denotes the i
th dynamic attribute. For the sake of sim-
plicity, let us consider the following three dynamic attributes:
ac,1 =“location”, ac,2 =“risk level associated with her recent
app usage” and ac,3 =“unlock failures in last two days”. Now
the data owner defines AC = {ac,1 = “LONDON”, ac,2 < “3”
and ac,3 < “2” } and computes E0 = h(yes||yes||yes)Y
sA+sB .
Let us assume that the risk level varies between 1 to 10 where
higher risk denoted by larger value. However, different organi-
zations may define the risk level based on their own standards.
For example, if a particular document is highly classified then,
the organization sets high risk value for that document rather
than ordinary documents.
In the decryption phase, “behavior-profiling” app pre-
installed in the users’ mobile device determines its location.
As explained in Section 4.1.2 mapping function, M, which in-
puts data owners dynamic attribute requirements and smart de-
vice readings and output ′′yes′′ or ′′no′′, e.g., if the current risk
level is less than the threshold defined by the data owner then
M(ac,2 < “3”) = yes. This ensures that even a user has all the
credentials from AA, dynamic attributes enforced by the data
owner must be satisfied before the decryption. We analyse the
security of the behavior-profiling corporate app in the security
analysis section in Section 6.3.
4.3. Security Game
In order to avoid security vulnerabilities, the ABE based
schemes must be proved to be secure against selective iden-
tity (ID) model [10]. In selective ID model, adversary must
provide the challenge identities he wishes to challenge to chal-
lenger. Then the challenger (i.e., system) will generate neces-
sary parameters corresponding to the challenge identities and
send them to the adversary. Only one requirement is that cre-
dentials for at least one attribute in the challenge identity can-
not be revealed to the adversary. Then adversary is allowed
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Setup S
• AA generates group bilinear parameters: q, g,G1,← S(1
λ;σ), for a given security parameter λ and σ ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ).
• AA randomly generates secrets y, tA,i ∈ Zq for each attribute i (1 ≤ i ≤ N) where N is the total number of attributes
monitored by the authority.
• AA publishes the corresponding public keys {Ti = g
tA,i } ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N} and Y = eˆ(g, g)y.
Key Issuing KG
• To issue decryption keys for user u, AA chooses a random polynomial pu with degree d − 1 where pu(0) = y. It
should be noted that pu(0) for any users should be equivalent to y.
• AA generates decryption credential for ith attribute for u as: Du(i) = g
pu(i)/tA,i where ∀i ∈ AU (AU denotes the attributes
set of u).
Encryption E
Data owner encrypts data m for attribute set Am = AA
∪
AC , where AA = {aa,1, . . . , aa,l} denotes the attributes maintained
by AA and AC = {ac,1, . . . , ac,n} denotes the dynamic attributes defined by the data owner, as follows:
* Data owner randomly chooses sA, sB ∈ Zq and encrypts the data as Encm = mY
sB .
* Data owner computes E0 = h(M(ac,1)||M(ac,2)|| . . . ||M(ac,n))Y
sA+sB , Ei = g
ti sA ,∀i ∈ AA, where h : {0, 1} → Zq is a
secure hash function, M is a mapping function of dynamic attributes and || denotes concatenation.
* Now data owner uploads CTm = {Encm, E0, Ei,∀i ∈ AA and AC} into the cloud.
Decryption D
* User downloads CTm from the cloud and checks the required attributes to decrypt m.
* User computes eˆ(Ei, Du(i)) = eˆ(g, g)
pu(i)sA where i ∈ AA
∩
AU .
* Using interpolation technique, u can compute Y sA = eˆ(g, g)pu(0)sA = eˆ(g, g)ysA .
* Now corporate app installed in users mobile device computes the hash value of dynamic attributes such as cur-
rent location, risk-level associated with current location and risk-level associated with user behavior and outputs
h(M(a′
c,1
)||M(a′
c,2
)|| . . . ||M(a′c,n)).
* User can decrypt the data as follows (only if h(M(a′
c,1
)||M(a′
c,2
)|| . . . ||M(a′c,n)) = h(M(ac,1)||M(ac,2)|| . . . ||M(ac,n)))
Encm.
h(M(a′
c,1
)||M(a′
c,2
)||...||M(a′c,n))Y
sA
E0
= mY sB .
h(M(a′
c,1
)||M(a′
c,2
)||...||M(a′c,n))Y
sA
h(M(ac,1)||M(ac,2)||...||M(ac,n))Y
sA+sB
= m.
Figure 3: Static and dynamic attribute based encryption scheme for single AA.
to make secret queries about challenge identities. If the ad-
versary cannot decrypt the encrypted message at the end with
non-negligible advantage then the proposed scheme is secure
against selective ID model. Formally, this is represented by the
following game between the adversary and challenger (here we
focus on single AA and the game can be extended for multi
authority):
Setup: The challenger runs the setup phase of the algorithm
and tells the adversary the public parameters.
Secret Key Queries: The adversary is allowed to make any
number of secret key queries. However, the only requirement is
that for each user, there must be at least one attribute for which
the adversary can get insufficient number secret keys.
Challenge: The adversary sends two messages m0 and m1 to
the challenger in plain domain. Now the challenger randomly
chooses one of the messages and encrypt it and send the cipher-
text to the adversary.
More Secret Key Queries: The adversary is allowed to
make more secret key queries as long as he satisfy the require-
ment given earlier.
Guess: Now the adversary guesses which message was en-
crypted by the challenger. The adversary is said to be successful
if he guesses the correct message with probability 1
2
+ϵ whereby
ϵ is non-negligible function.
5. Dynamic and Static Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme
for Multiple Attribute Authorities
In a single authority scenario, there is only one AA moni-
tors all the attributes and issues encryption and decryption cre-
dentials for the data owners and users. This single authority
becomes a fully trusted party to which the users have to prove
their attributes in order to obtain the decryption credentials. In
such a case, the AA has too much power and it can decrypt all
the data and knows about all the users’ attributes. In the event
of corruption, the message confidentiality cannot be achieved
and user’s privacy can be compromised by the attackers. This
is one of the limitations in single authority ABE scheme.
It is more convenient and secure to monitor and maintain
different sets of attributes by different attribute authorities in
reality, e.g., in healthcare one authority can monitor attributes
of nurse and doctors while another authority monitors attributes
of administrators and human resources [34] or in vehicular Ad
hoc network different identities can be monitored by different
authorities [35]. Hence, it is more convenient to have multiple
attribute authorities where each AA can maintain attributes
belonging to one department. MA-ABE scheme without
incorporating the dynamic attributes was proposed in [31, 32].
Hence, similar to Fig. 3, static and dynamic attributes based
MA-ABE scheme is given in Fig. 4. In our scheme, we assume
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that there are K number of attribute authorities. Each AA
manages N number of different attributes and issues creden-
tials for the users based on their eligible attributes. Let us
briefly explain the functionalities of each sub-algorithms below.
Setup: The setup algorithm takes security parameters λ as
input, and outputs a bilinear group and a set of parameters. Pa-
rameters q, g1, g2,G1,G2,GT are public parameters. Parame-
ters vk and xk are the private-keys known only to k
th AA and
the corresponding public-keys Yk = eˆ(g1, g2)
vk and yk = g
xk
1
are
known to all. Two attribute authorities share a private-key s jk
which is known only to the two attribute authorities. Param-
eter tk,i denote the i
th attribute maintained by kth AA and the
corresponding public-key is Tk,i = g
tk,i
2
.
Key Issuing: User and AA execute anonymous key-issuing
protocol proposed in [32]. User computes decryption credential
Dk j for j
th attribute by collaborating with kth AA. Once user ob-
tained all the Dk j, she will compute Du followed by S k,i. Since
this is based on anonymous key-issuing protocol, attribute au-
thorities cannot be able to profile the users.
Encryption: The encryption algorithm takes a set of at-
tributes maintained by attribute authorities as well as a set of
dynamic attributes defined by data owner as inputs. Then it
output the ciphertext of the data. This step is same as the single
authority case.
Decryption: The decryption algorithm takes the decryption
credentials received from attribute authorities and dynamic pa-
rameters obtained from smart mobile device and the ciphertext
as input and output the original data. The behavior-profiling
app securely computes the hash value of the required dynamic
attributes followed by multiplication with Y sA . The decryp-
tion is successful if and only if h(M(a′
c,1
)||M(a′
c,2
)|| . . . ||M(a′c,n))
= h(M(ac,1)||M(ac,2)|| . . . ||M(ac,n)).
6. Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyse the computation and communica-
tion costs associated with both the single and multi-authority
algorithms proposed in this paper. As described in the re-
lated work section, the works related to the proposed algorithms
are the conventional ABE schemes. Hence, the efficiencies of
the proposed algorithms are demonstrated by comparing them
against the conventional ABE schemes.
6.1. Computational Complexity
Let us consider the single authority ABE scheme followed
by MA-ABE scheme. In a single authority ABE scheme (i.e.,
Fig. 1), the user is involved in the computation during the de-
cryption step and the data owner is involved in the encryption
step. We can ignore the computational costs involved in the
setup and key-issuing steps since those can be done during the
idle time. Since the computational cost for hash function is neg-
ligible compared to pairing and exponentiation, let us denote
the computational time (in ms) for one multiplication, one ex-
ponentiation, and one pairing as Cm, Cex, and Cp, respectively.
For comparison, let us use the benchmark time values given
with popular pairing-based cryptography library namely jPBC
in [36]. Table 2 shows the time values (in ms) for Cm, Cex, and
Cp for two different testbeds: testbed 1 uses Intel(R) Core(TM)
2 Quad CPU Q6600 with 2.40GHz and 3 GB memory running
on Ubuntu 10.04 and testbed 2 uses HTC Desire HD A9191
smart phone running on Android 2.2. The time values given in
Table 2 are for a symmetric elliptic curve called a-curve, where
the base field size is 512-bit and the embedding degree is 2. The
a-curve has a 160-bit group order. Let us assume that the data
owner uses an environment similar to the testbed 1 for the en-
cryption while user uses a mobile device similar to the testbed
2 for the decryption.
Table 2: Time complexity measures for two different testbeds.
Testbed 1 (ms) Testbed 2 (ms)
Cp 14.6 491.2
Cex 2.8 34.1
Cm 1.8 20
Table 3: Comparison of computational cost for the single authority ABE
scheme and the proposed scheme.
ABE Scheme Proposed Scheme
Enc. (n + 1)Cex +Cm (n + 2)Cex + 2Cm
Dec. nCp + nCm nCp + (n + 2)Cm
Let us denote the number of attributes used for encryption
as n and the total number of dynamic attributes used by data
owner as d. Table 3 shows the total time required for encryp-
tion (by the data owner) and for decryption (by the user) for the
proposed and the conventional ABE schemes for the single AA.
In order to graphically visualize the actual difference between
proposed and conventional algorithms, we plotted the compu-
tational complexities given in Table 3 by varying the number of
attributes, n, in Fig. 5.
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Figure 5: Computational complexity comparison for single authority case.
Fig. 5 shows the computational complexity of the conven-
tional ABE scheme against the proposed scheme. The compu-
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Setup S: For a given security parameters λ and σ ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ), group bilinear parameters are generated by the attribute
authorities as follows: q, g1, g2,G1,G2,GT ← S(1
λ;σ). Now, attribute authorities interact with each other and execute
the following:
• kth AA randomly chooses vk ∈R Zq and computes Yk = eˆ(g1, g2)
vk , and sends Yk to the other attribute authorities,
where each AA computes Y =
∏
Yk = eˆ(g1, g2)
∑
k vk .
• Each pair of attribute authorities shares a secret, kth authority and jth authority randomly choose sk j ∈ Zq such that
sk j = s jk.
• kth authority randomly chooses xk ∈ Zq and computes yk = g
xk
1
. Using the shared secret sk, j and u, attribute authorities
k and j computes y
x j/(sk j+u)
k
and y
xk/(sk j+u)
j
, respectively.
• kth AA randomly chooses a secret tk,i ∈ Zq for i
th attribute, and computes the corresponding public key as Tk,i = g
tk,i
2
(∀i ∈ {1, ..., Nk} and k ∈ {1, ..., K}), where Nk is the number of attributes monitored by authority k.
Key Issuing KG: User u executes the following steps with each authority k:
• For j ∈ {1, ..., K} / {k}, user gets the Dk j = g
Rk j
1
y
x j/(sk j+u)
k
for k > j or Dk j = g
Rk j
1
y
(sk j+u)/x j
k
if k < j, where Rk, j ∈ Zq is a
random value.
• After obtained all Dk j, user computes Du =
∏
(k, j)∈{1,...,N}×{1,...,N}/{k} Dk j = g
Ru
1
, where
Ru =
∑
(k, j)∈{1,...,K}×{1,...,K}/{k} Rk j.
• If user u satisfies dk number of attributes, then k
th AA randomly picks a dk-degree polynomial pk,u with pk,u(0) =
vk −
∑
j∈{1,...,K}/{k} Rk j.
• Authority k computes S k,i = g
pk,u(i)/tk,i
1
, i ∈ [1, . . . , Nk], ∀k.
Encryption E: Data owner encrypts data m for attribute set Am = A
1
A
∪
A2
A
∪
. . . AK
A
∪
AC as follows (i.e. A
k
A
, ∀ k denotes
the attribute set maintained by kth AA):
* Data owner randomly picks sA, sB ∈R Zq and encrypts the data as follows: Encm = mY
sB .
* Data owner computes E0 = h(M(ac,1)||M(ac,2)|| . . . ||M(ac,n))Y
sA+sB , E1 = g
sA
2
,
{
Ck,i = T
sA
k,i
}
, i ∈ Ak
A
,∀k ∈ [1, ..., N].
* Now Data owner uploads CTm = {Encm, E0, E1,Ck,i∀i ∈ AA and AC} into the cloud.
Decryption D
* User downloads CTm from the cloud and checks the required attributes to decrypt m.
* For each authority k:
* Using S k,i and the corresponding Ck,i, user computes eˆ
(
S k,i,Ck,i
)
= eˆ (g1, g2)
sA pk,u(i).
* User interpolates all eˆ (g1, g2)
sA pk,u(i) and gets Pk,u = eˆ (g1, g2)
sA pk,u(0) = eˆ (g1, g2)
sA(vk−
∑
j,k Rk j) .
* User multiplies all Pk,u’s together and gets Q = eˆ(g1, g2)
sA
∑
vk−sARu = Y
sA
eˆ
(
g
Ru
1
,g
sA
2
) .
* Now corporate app installed in users’ mobile device computes h(M(a′
c,1
)||M(a′
c,2
)|| . . . ||M(a′c,n)).
* User can decrypt the data as follows (only if h(M(a′
c,1
)||M(a′
c,2
)|| . . . ||M(a′c,n)) = h(M(ac,1)||M(ac,2)|| . . . ||M(ac,n)))
Encm.
h(M(a′
c,1
)||M(a′
c,2
)||...||M(a′c,n))Qeˆ(Du,E1)
E0
= mY sB .
h(M(a′
c,1
)||M(a′
c,2
)||...||M(a′c,n))Y
sA
h(M(ac,1)||M(ac,2)||...||M(ac,n))Y
sA+sB
= m.
Figure 4: Static and dynamic attribute based encryption algorithm scheme for multiple attribute authorities.
Table 4: Comparison of computational cost for the MA-ABE scheme and the
proposed scheme.
MA-ABE Scheme Proposed Scheme
Enc. (nK + 2)Cex +Cm (nK + 3)Cex + 2Cm
Dec. (nK + 1)Cp + (nK + 1)Cm (nK + 1)Cp + (nK + 3)Cm
tational complexity is measured in terms of total time required
for the data owner and the user to encrypt and decrypt the data,
respectively. For the encryption, our scheme consumes nearly
9ms more than the conventional ABE. However, the proposed
scheme incorporates the dynamic attributes during the encryp-
tion which provides run-time security to the data owner. It is
worth noting from Fig. 5 that the time difference between our
scheme and the conventional ABE for encryption is indepen-
dent of the number of attributes (i.e., time complexity orders
for both the schemes are same for encryption). However, our
scheme is capable of including dynamic attributes on top of the
regular attributes. For the decryption, it is obvious from Fig. 5
that our scheme performs equally well as the conventional ABE
scheme. Since the decryption is performed in smart device (i.e.,
testbed 2) which is less powerful than desktop computer (i.e.,
testbed 1), the decryption time is almost 100 times higher than
the encryption time.
Now let us compare our static and dynamic MA-ABE based
algorithm against conventional MA-ABE scheme. Table 4
compares the computational complexity of the proposed MA-
ABE algorithm with Chase and Chow’s MA-ABE scheme in
[32]. We denote the total number of attribute authorities in
the system as K whereby each AA maintains N number of at-
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tributes (for simplicity, we assumed that all attribute authorities
maintain equal number of attributes).
Fig. 6 compares both the proposed scheme and the conven-
tional MA-ABE scheme in terms of time complexity for differ-
ent numbers of attribute authorities (i.e., K = {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}).
Encryption and decryption time increases with the total num-
ber of attribute authorities. For the encryption, similar to sin-
gle authority case, the time complexity orders of both schemes
are same (i.e., our scheme consume nearly 5ms more than con-
ventional MA-ABE scheme irrespective of number of attributes
and number of attribute authorities). Moreover, for decryption,
our scheme performs equally well as the conventional MA-
ABE scheme regardless of number of attribute authorities in-
volved in the encryption.
Remarks: One of the drawbacks of the existing ABE
schemes is that the complexity increases linearly with the num-
ber of static attributes. Since our algorithm was built on top of
the existing ABE scheme the same follows. If the data owner
or employer wants to use attribute authorities to issue creden-
tials for dynamic attributes then complexity will increase lin-
early since those dynamic attributes become static attributes.
However, in our solution, as seen from Fig. 7, any number of
dynamic attributes can be added for negligible cost. Hence the
complexity can be reduced by reducing the number of static
attributes and adding more dynamic attributes used for encryp-
tion. For example, instead of including ten static attributes from
attribute authorities, it is possible in our scheme that the data
owner can include five static attributes from attribute authori-
ties and another five dynamic attributes. This approach reduces
the complexity by half. However, the proposed scheme adds
additional layer of security on top of the conventional ABE
schemes. In a nutshell, the proposed schemes do not degrade
the performance of conventional ABE while including the dy-
namic attributes to provide run-time security to the data owner’s
data.
6.2. Communications Complexity
Now we discuss communication costs for the proposed
schemes and the conventional ABE schemes. For both the
schemes, the communication costs are relying on the key-
issuing step and when uploading and downloading the data.
Since, key issuing step is purely dependent on the communi-
cation between attribute authorities and the data owner, com-
munication costs for our and conventional schemes in this step
are equal. During uploading and downloading the data, the ad-
ditional components added to the proposed schemes are E0 and
AC . It should be noted that the size of E0 is 160−bits. AC de-
notes the dynamic attributes used during the encryption, hence
2d number of bits required to represent one dynamic attributes
e.g., if the system consider five dynamic attributes then 32−bits
required to denote each dynamic attribute (see Fig. 2 and Fig.
3). Overall, the increment in the communications cost in the
proposed algorithm is negligible.
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Figure 7: Complexity can be reduced by our scheme if more dynamic attributes
are incorporated within encryption.
7. Security and Privacy Analysis
In Section 3.3, we categorized the possible security and pri-
vacy threats to the proposed algorithms. In this section, we ad-
dress each issue and validate that our algorithm is robust against
those security and privacy threats.
7.1. Mitigate Identity Threat
Adversary can impersonate as an AA or as users. Let us dis-
cuss these in turn. As shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, public-
keys associated with attribute authorities will be published on-
line and the corresponding private-keys are known only to the
authorities. At the same time, according to the modulo arith-
metic, it is infeasible to compute private-keys from public-keys.
During the encryption and decryption, data owners and users
use attribute authorities. Data owner and users can verify the
public-keys using well-known techniques such as certificates.
Hence, impersonating AA is not possible.
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Figure 6: Computational complexity comparison when there are more than one AA.
User device might be at the possession of an attacker where
user static attribute credentials are stored on the device. How-
ever, adversary cannot get access in to the network without sat-
isfying the dynamic attributes introduced in this paper. Adver-
sary behavior may not be similar as the legitimate user, hence,
behavior-profiling app running in the user device increases the
risk level which will eventually alert the network to deny the
service request.
7.2. Mitigate Privacy Threats
User’s privacy is vulnerable when user interacts with at-
tribute authorities in order to get decryption keys i.e., in key
issuing sub-algorithms. The proposed schemes were built on
top of conventional ABE architectures [32]. In [32], users
and attribute authorities execute anonymous key issuing pro-
tocol where user can obtain decryption keys for the attributes
without revealing identity. In Fig. 4, in key issuing sub-
algorithm, decryption key for user u obtained from authority j
is Dk j = g
Rk j
1
y
x j/(sk j+u)
k
. This Dk j was obtained by executing the
anonymous key-issuing protocol where user’s identity u was in-
corporated within decryption key. However, the authority can-
not be able to know the identity of the users, which preserve the
user privacy.
7.3. Mitigate Collusion Attacks
Two different types of collusion attacks are possible: 1) at-
tribute authorities can collide with each other and aggregate the
user attributes, 2) users can pool their decryption keys to access
the data which cannot be accessed by individual users. Since
our schemes were built top of the conventional ABE scheme,
the proposed schemes also collusion resistance against up to
(N − 2) attribute authorities. Hence, let us discuss the user col-
lusion. During the key issuing sub-algorithms, due to the in-
herent anonymous key issuing protocol, user u will obtain only
Dk j = g
Rk j
1
y
x j/(sk j+u)
k
where user identity u incorporated within
decryption key by inverse exponentiation operation after adding
u with random value sk j (known only to authority). In modulo
arithmetic, it is infeasible to infer x j/(sk j + u) from y
x j/(sk j+u)
k
.
Moreover, the user identity was randomized by sk j, it is impos-
sible to modify u with other user’s identity.
7.4. Mitigate Dynamic Attribute Cheating
The behavior-profiling app installed on the user’s mobile de-
vice can be used to verify whether the current user is the legit-
imate user of the mobile device [26, 27]. However, since the
behavior-profiling app is installed within user’s device, mali-
cious users might modify the app in order to feed false informa-
tion for dynamic attributes. Recent technology development in
smart device industry already has some working prototype for
this kind of security vulnerability i.e., Samsung’s KNOX [29]
and Blackberry’s BES [30]. These softwares are capable of se-
curely installing apps on the users mobile devices and check for
integrity of the installed apps without user interruption. Hence,
modifying behavior-profiling app in order to feed false infor-
mation can be easily detected by the data owner using either
KNOX or BES. These software platforms are capable of se-
curely installing corporate apps (i.e., behavior-profiling app) on
the users mobile devices and check for integrity of the installed
apps.
7.5. Mitigate Tracking Threat
In the previous section we considered the user as an adver-
sary. However data owner or employer can also be an adver-
sary since their behavior profiling app collects sensor data from
user’s device. If the app is malicious then it is obvious that it
will send the sensor data to the employer or third-parties who
then can monitor or track the user. However, according to the
proposed algorithm it is not necessary to send out the sensor
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data outside the mobile device since mapping is carried out
within user device. Employer should certify or validate the app
in order to build a trust among users. Since it is easy to de-
tect whether apps are behaving maliciously [44] we can expect
that the employers will not develop an app which send out the
sensor data outside the mobile device.
7.6. Security Analysis
Theorem 1. The proposed scheme is semantically secure
against chosen plain text attack (CPA) in the selective ID model,
if there exist negligible function ϵ such that, in the security game
explained earlier any adversary will succeed with probability at
most 1
2
+ ϵ.
Proof. Suppose if there is a probabilistic polynomial time
adversary who can break our algorithm then there will be a
challenger who can break the decisional MBDH assumption by
exploiting the adversary. Lets assume that the challenger is pro-
vided with [ga
1
, gb
1
, gc
1
,Z] and if the challenger wants to break
the MBDH assumption then he needs to determine whether
Z = e(g, g)
ab
c or not with at least 1
2
+ ϵ probability.
Let us assume that there is an adversary who can break the
proposed algorithm. In this section, we will show that the chal-
lenger can use such an adversary to break the MBDH assump-
tion. In order to exploit such an adversary, the challenger needs
to incorporate the given [ga, gb, gc,Z] within the proposed al-
gorithm (i.e., Fig. 3). First of all, let us explain how the chal-
lenger incorporates [ga, gb, gc,Z] within global setup, authority
setup, and key generation sub-algorithms. We stress here that
this incorporation is indistinguishable from the steps provided
in Fig. 3.
Initially, as explained in the security game, the adversary
must submit a set of attributes he wants to challenge. One of
the conditions as given in security game is that at least there
will be one attribute for each set whereby the adversary can get
insufficient number of decryption credentials [31].
Lets assume the adversary sends a set of attributes, α, to the
challenger. The challenger assigns the public key parameters as
follows. It sets the parameter Y = e(g, A) = e(g, g)a. For all
i ∈ α it chooses random βi R
←−−
Zp and sets Ti = C
βi = gcβi . For
all other attributes, it chooses random wi R
←−−
Zp and sets Ti =
gwi . It then gives the public parameters to adversary. Notice that
from the view of adversary all parameters are chosen at random
as in the construction.
Suppose an adversary requests a private key for attribute set
γ where |γ ∩ α| < d. We first define three sets Γ, Γ′, and S
in the following manner: Γ = |Γ ∩ α|, Γ′ can be any set such
that Γ ⊆ Γ′ ⊆ γ and |Γ| = d − 1 and S = Γ′
∪
{0}. Now let
us define decryption keys Du(i) for i ∈ Γ
′ as follows: if i ∈ Γ
then Du(i) = g
si where si R
←−−
Zp. If i ∈ Γ
′ − Γ then Du(i) = g
λi
wi
where λi R
←−−
Zp.
The intuition behind these assignments is that we are implic-
itly choosing a random d − 1 degree polynomial q(x) by choos-
ing its value for the d − 1 points randomly in addition to having
q(0) = a. For i ∈ Γ we have q(i) = cβisi and for i ∈ Γ
′ − Γ we
have q(i) = λi. The challenger can calculate the other Du(i) val-
ues where i < Γ′ since the challenger knows the discrete log of
Ti. The challenger makes the assignments as follows: If i < Γ
′
then
Du(i) = (
∏
j∈Γ
C
β j s j∆ j,S (i)
wi )(
∏
j∈Γ′−Γ
g
λ j∆ j,S (i)
wi )(Y
∆0,S (i)
wi ).
Using polynomial interpolation the challenger is able to cal-
culate Du(i) = g
q(i)
ti for i < Γ′ where q(x) was implicitly defined
by the random assignment of the other d−1 variables Du(i) ∈ Γ
and the variable Y . Hence, the challenger is able to construct a
private key for the attribute set γ. Moreover, the distribution of
the private key for γ is identical to that of the original scheme.
Now the adversary submits two challenge messages m1 and
m0 to the challenger. The simulator flips a fair binary coin,
υ, and returns an encryption of mυ. The ciphertext is output
CTm = {E0 = h(M(ac,1)||M(ac,1)|| . . . M(ac,n))mυZ, Ei = B
βi
i∈α
}.
If υ = 0 then Z = e(g, g)
ab
c . If we let sA + sB =
b
c
, then we
have E0 = h(M(ac,1)||M(ac,1)|| . . . M(ac,n))mυY
sA+sB and Ei =
Bβi
CsB
= gbβi−sB = g
b
c
cβi−csB = (Ti)
sA . Therefore, the cipher-
text is a random encryption of the message mυ under the pub-
lic key α. Otherwise, if υ = 1, then Z = gz. We then have
E0 = h(M(ac,1)||M(ac,1)|| . . . M(ac,n))mυe(g, g)
z. Since z is ran-
dom, E0 will be a random element and the adversaries view and
the message contains no information about mυ [10].
We stress here that CTm is a valid encryption of the message
mυ if Z = e(g, g)
ab
c . Hence, the adversary should have his usual
non-negligible advantage ϵ of correctly identifying the message
mυ. However, when Z , e(g, g)
ab
c , then CTm is just random
value, hence, the adversary can have no more than 1
2
probability
of guessing correctly. Hence, if the adversary guesses correctly
then challenger guesses that Z = e(g, g)
ab
c and if adversary is
wrong then challenger guesses that Z , Z = e(g, g)
ab
c , hence,
the challenger has an advantage of ϵ
2
in distinguishing whether
Z = e(g, g)
ab
c . Hence, an adversary who breaks our scheme with
advantage ϵ implies an algorithm for breaking MBDH assump-
tion with non-negligible advantage ϵ
2
. We can conclude that the
proposed scheme is selective ID secure.
Similarly this proof can be extended to multi-authority sys-
tem. As shown in [32], for the multi-authority case, we divide
the authorities into two: honest authorities and corrupted au-
thorities. First we have to set up parameters so that we can set
any of our authorities as the one that corresponds to the uncom-
putable portion of the master key. Then an AA k∗ chosen at
random form its parameters based on this uncomputable value.
If it turns out that this is the honest authority from which the
adversary requests insufficient attributes for user u, then we are
all set, and we can simply reuse the above technique [32].
8. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Works
In this paper, we proposed robust access control technique
which incorporates attributes generated by smart devices to se-
cure the conventional access control framework. In the pro-
posed schemes, data owner incorporates smart device’s dy-
namic attributes together with predefined static attributes. This
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approach adds additional layer of security on top of the secu-
rity available in conventional access control framework. We
showed that the efficiencies of the proposed schemes are com-
parable to that of the conventional schemes while offering better
security and flexibility for mobile computing network.
8.1. Limitations and Future Works
Collecting and processing the sensor data to determine the
values for dynamic attributes increase the time or communica-
tion complexity. At present it is assumed that this will be done
in off-line or in parallel to downloading the encrypted data from
the cloud. Evaluating this latency for different smart devices in
various environments could be a potential extension.
Another limitation is the accuracy or number of algorithms
available for detecting a user behavior. Potential extension
could be on developing an app which aggregates data from all
the smart device sensors to profile the user’s behavior. Multi-
ple physical activities such as the way individuals walk or the
way we take out the phone from pocket can be used to profile
a user. Developing a novel algorithm using machine learning
techniques to classify users based on behavior is important to
bridge the gap between theory and practice.
There are several variants of KP-ABE in literature [45, 46,
47]. These variants either enhance the security by adopting
fully secure model or improve the complexity by fast decryp-
tion technique and outsourcing the pairing computations to the
cloud. Hence repeating the proposed technique, i.e., adding dy-
namic attributes, on top of these schemes will further improve
the complexity as well as the security.
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